Abstract. In this paper we treat the specification problem in classical realizability (as defined in [20]) in the case of arithmetical formulae. In the continuity of [10] and [11], we characterize the universal realizers of a formula as being the winning strategies for a game (defined according to the formula). In the first section we recall the definition of classical realizability, as well as a few technical results. In Section 5, we introduce in more details the specification problem and the intuition of the game-theoretic point of view we adopt later. We first present a game G 1 , that we prove to be adequate and complete if the language contains no instructions 'quote' [18], using interaction constants to do substitution over execution threads. Then we show that as soon as the language contain 'quote', the game is no more complete, and present a second game G 2 that is both adequate and complete in the general case. In the last Section, we draw attention to a model-theoretic point of view, and use our specification result to show that arithmetical formulae are absolute for realizability models.
Introduction
The so called Curry-Howard correspondence has constituted an important breakthrough in proof theory, by evidencing a strong connection between the notions of functional programing and proof theory [5, 12, 9] . For a longtime, this correspondence has been limited to intuitionistic proofs and constructive mathematics, so that classical reasonings, that are omnipresent in mathematics, could only be retrieved through negative translations to intuitionistic logic [7] or to linear logic [8] .
In 1990, Griffin discovered that the control operator call/cc (for 'call with current continuation') of the Scheme programming language could be typed by the law of Peirce ((A → B) → A) → A), extending so the formuae-as-types interpretation [12] . As Peirce's law is known to imply all the other forms of classical reasoning (excluded middle, reductio ad absurdum, double negation elimination, etc.), this discovery opened the way for a direct computational interpretation of classical proofs, using control operators and their ability to backtrack. Several calculi have born from this idea, such as Parigot's λµ-calculus [30] , Barbanera and Berardi's symmetric λ-calculus [1], Krivine's λ c -calculus [20] or Curien and Herbelin'sλµ-calculus [4] .
Nonetheless, some difficulties quickly appeared in the analysis of the computational behaviors of programs extracted from classical proofs. One reason for these difficulties was precisely the presence of control operators, whose ability to backtrack breaks the linearity of the execution of programs. But more importantly, the formulae-as-types interpretation suffered from the lack of a theory connecting the point of view of typing with the point of view of computation. Realizability was designed in intuitionistic logic by Kleene for that purpose, to interpret the computational contents of the proofs of Heyting arithmetic [14] , and has been extended later to more general framework, like intuitionistic set theories [28, 6, 24] . However, the theory of realizability as designed by Kleene is intrinsically incompatible with classical reasoning 1 .
Classical realizibility.
To address this problem, Krivine introduced in the middle of the nineties the theory of classical realizability [20] , which is a complete reformulation 1 For instance, the negation of the middle excluded principle is intuitionistically realizable, and the same apply to other statement whereas there are classically provable of the very principles of realizability to make them compatible with classical reasoning. (As noticed in [29, 26] , classical realizability can be seen as a reformulation of Kleene's realizability through Friedman's A-translation [7] .) Although it was initially introduced to interpret the proofs of classical second-order arithmetic, the theory of classical realizability can be scaled to more expressive theories such as Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory [17] or the calculus of constructions with universes [25] .
As in intuitionistic realizability, every formula A is interpreted in classical realizability as a set |A| of programs called the realizers of A, that share a common computational behavior dictated by the structure of the formula A. This point of view is related to the point of view of deduction (and of typing) via the property of adequacy, that expresses that any program extracted from a proof of A-that is: any program of type A-realizes the formula A, and thus has the computational behavior expected from the formula A.
But the difference between intuitionistic and classical realizability is that in the latter, the set of realizers of A is defined indirectly, that is: from a set A of execution contexts (represented as argument stacks) that are intended to challenge the truth of A. Intuitively, the set A -which we shall call the falsity value of A-can be understood as the set of all possible counter-arguments to the formula A. In this framework, a program realizes the formula A-i.e. belongs to the truth value |A|-if and only if it is able to defeat all the attempts to refute A using a stack in A . (The definition of the classical notion of a realizer is also parameterized by a pole representing a particular challenge, that we shall define and discuss in Section 4.1.1.)
By giving an equal importance to programs-or terms-that 'defend' the formula A, and to execution contexts-or stacks-that 'attack' the formula A, the theory of classical realizability is thus able to describe the interpretation of classical reasoning in terms of manipulation of whole stacks (as first class citizens) using control operators.
Krivine λ c -calculus.
The programing language commonly used in classical realizability is Krivine's λ c -calculus, which is an extension of Church's λ-calculus [3] containing an instruction cc (representing the operator control call/cc). and continuations constants emmbedding stacks. Unlike the traditional λ-calculus, the λ c -calculus is parameterized by a particular execution strategy -corresponding to the Krivine Abstract Machine [19] so that the notion of confluence-which is central in traditional λ-calculi, does not make sense anymore. The property of confluence is replaced by the property of determinism, which is closer from the viewpoint of real programming languages.
A pleasant feature of this calculus is that it can be enriched with ad hoc extra instructions. For instance, a print instruction might be added to trace an execution, as well as extra instructions manipulating primitive numerals to do some code optimization [26] . In some situation, extra instructions can also be designed to realize reasoning principles, the standard example of this is the instruction quote that computes the Gödel code of a stack, and that is used in [18] to realize the axiom of dependent choices. In this paper, we shall consider this instruction as well as another one eq, that tests the syntactic equality between two λ c -terms.
1.3. The specification problem. A central problem in classical realizability is the specification problem, that is to find a characterization for the (universal) realizers of a formula by their computational behavior. In intuitionistic logic, this characterization does not contain more information than the formula itself, so that this problem has been given little attention. For instance the realizers of an existential formula ∃ N xA(x) are exactly the one reducing to a pair made of a witness n ∈ N and a proof term realizing A(n) [15] .
However, in classical realizability the situation appears to be quite different, and the desired characterization is in general much more difficult to obtain. Indeed, owing to the presence of control operators in the language of terms, the realizers have the ability to backtrack at any time, making the execution harder to predict. Considering for instance the very same formula ∃ N xA(x), a classical realizer of it can give as many integers for x as he wants, using backtrack to make another try. Hence we can not expect from such a realizer to reduct directly to a witness (for an account of witness extraction techniques in classical realizability, see [26] ). Even more, as we will see in Section 5.3, giving such a witness might be computationally impossible without backtrack, for example in the case of a formula relying on the Halting Problem. We will treat this particular example in Section 5.3.
Furthermore, as stated in [11] , the presence of instructions such as quote makes the problem still more subtle. We will deal with this particular case in the Section 7.
1.4. Specifying arithmetical formulae. The architecture of classical realizability is centered around the opposition between falsity values (stacks) and truth values (terms). This opposition, as well as the underlying intuition (opponents vs. defenders), naturally leads us to consider the problem in a game-theoretic setting. Such a setting has been defined by the first author in his PhD [10] , to address the problem of the specification of Σ 0 2 -formulae. In the general case of Σ 0 n -formulae, that is of the form
, an attempt to characterize the threads of universal realizers is also given in [18] , but the characterization that is given does not give a precise specification. Both results left open the question of giving a precise specification for arithmetical formulae in the general case.
In this paper we will rephrase the game-theoretic framework of [10] to provide a gametheoretic characterization G 1 that is both complete and adequate, in the particular case where the underlying calculus contains infinitely many interaction constant. However, this hypothesis-that is crucial in our proof of completeness-is known to be incompatible with the presence of instruction such as quote or eq, which allow us to distinguish syntactically λ c terms that are computationally equivalent. We exhibit in Section 6.3 a wild realizer that uses these instructions and does not suit as a winning strategy for G 1 , what proves that G 1 is no more complete in this case. Indeed, as highlighted in [11] , the presence of such instructions introduces a newand purely game-theoretic-form of backtrack that does come from a control operator, but from the fact that realizers, using a syntactic equality test provided by quote, can check whether a position has already appeared before. We present in Section 7 a second game G 2 that allows this new form of backtrack, and so capture the behavior of our wild realizer. Then we prove that without any assumption on the set of instructions, this game is both adequate and complete, thus constituting the definitive specification of arithmetical formulae.
1.5. Connexion with forcing. In addition to the question of knowing how to specify arithmetical formulae, this paper presents an answer to another open question, that is to know whether arithmetical formulae are absolute for realizability models. In set theory, a common technique to prove independence results in theory is to use forcing, that allows us to extend a model and add some specific properties to it. Yet, it is known Σ 1 2 -formulae are absolute for a large class of models, including those produced by forcing. This constitutes somehow a barrier to forcing, that does not permit to change the truth of formulae that are below Σ 1 2 in the arithmetical hierarchy. If classical realizability was initially designed to be a semantics for proofs of Peano second-order arithmetic, it appeared then to be scalable to build models for high-order arithmetic [27] or set theory [21] . Just like forcing techniques, these constructions rest upon a ground model and permit us to break some formulae that were true in the ground model, say the continuum hypothesis or the axiom of choice [22] . More, the absoluteness theorem of Σ 2 1 does not apply to realizability model. Hence it seems quite natural to wonder, as for forcing, whether realizability models preserve some formulae. We will explain in Section 8 how the specification results allow us to show that arithmetical formulae are absolute for realizability models.
The language λ c
A lot of the notion we use in this paper has the very same as in [11] . We will recall them briefly, for a more gentle introduction, we enjoy the reader to refer to [11] .
Substitution over terms and stacks
First-order terms e 1 , e 2 ::
Second-order encodings
Typing rules of second-order logic terms, that represent programs, and stacks, that represent evaluation contexts. Formally, terms and stacks of the λ c -calculus are defined (see Fig. 1 ) from three auxiliary sets of symbols, that are pairwise disjoint:
• A denumerable set V λ of λ-variables (notation: x, y, z, etc.)
• A countable set C of instructions, that contains at least an instruction cc ∈ C ('call/cc', for: call with current continuation).
• A nonempty countable set B of stack constants, also called stack bottoms (notation: α, β, γ, etc.)
In what follows, we adopt the same writing conventions as in the pure λ-calculus, by considering that application is left-associative and has higher precedence than abstraction.
We also allow several abstractions to be regrouped under a single λ, so that the closed term λx . λy . λz . ((zx)y) can be more simply written λxyz . zxy.
As usual, terms and stacks are considered up to α-conversion [2] , and we denote by t{x := u} the term obtained by replacing every free occurrence of the variable x by the term u in the term t, possibly renaming the bound variables of t to prevent name clashes. The sets of all closed terms and of all (closed) stacks are respectively denoted by Λ and Π.
Definition 1 (Proof-like terms). -We say that a λ c -term t is proof-like if t contains no continuation constant k π . We denote by PL the set of all proof-like terms.
Finally, every natural number n ∈ N is represented in the λ c -calculus as the closed proof-like term n defined by
where 0 ≡ λx f . x and s ≡ λnx f . f (nx f ) are Church's encodings of zero and the successor function in the pure λ-calculus. Note that this encoding slightly differs from the traditional encoding of numerals in the λ-calculus, although the term n ≡ s n 0 is clearly β-convertible to Church's encoding λx f . f n x-and thus computationally equivalent. The reason for preferring this modified encoding is that it is better suited to the call-by-name discipline of Krivine's Abstract Machine (KAM) we shall now present.
Krivine's Abstract Machine.
In the λ c -calculus, computation occurs through the interaction between a closed term and a stack within Krivine's Abstract Machine (KAM). Formally, we call a process any pair t ⋆ π formed by a closed term t and a stack π. The set of all processes is written Λ ⋆ Π (which is just another notation for the Cartesian product of Λ by Π).
Definition 2 (Relation of evaluation). -We call a relation of one step evaluation any binary relation ≻ 1 over the set Λ ⋆ Π of processes that fulfils the following four axioms:
The reflexive-transitive closure of ≻ 1 is written ≻.
One of the specificities of the λ c -calculus is that it comes with a binary relation of (one step) evaluation ≻ 1 that is not defined, but axiomatized via the rules (Push), (Grab), (Save) and (Restore). In practice, the binary relation ≻ 1 is simply another parameter of the definition of the calculus, just like the sets C and B. Strictly speaking, the λ c -calculus is not a particular extension of the λ-calculus, but a family of extensions of the λ-calculus parameterized by the sets B, C and the relation of one step evaluation ≻ 1 . (The set V λ of λ-variables-that is interchangeable with any other denumerable set of symbols-does not really constitute a parameter of the calculus.) 2.3. Adding new instructions. The main interest of keeping open the definition of the sets B, C and of the relation evaluation ≻ 1 (by axiomatizing rather than defining them) is that it makes possible to enrich the calculus with extra instructions and evaluation rules, simply by putting additional axioms about C, B and ≻ 1 . On the other hand, the definitions of classical realizability [20] as well as its main properties do not depend on the particular choice of B, C and ≻ 1 , although the fine structure of the corresponding realizability models is of course affected by the presence of additional instructions and evaluation rules.
For the needs of the discussion in Section 6, we shall sometimes consider the following extra instructions in the set C:
• The instruction quote, that comes with the evaluation rule
where π → n π is a recursive injection from Π to N. Intuitively, the instruction quote computes the 'code' n π of the stack π, and passes it (using the encoding n → n described in Section 2.1) to the term t. This instruction was introduced in [18] to realize the axiom of dependent choices.
• The instruction eq, that comes with the evaluation rule
Intuitively, the instruction eq tests the syntactic equality of its first two arguments t 1 and t 2 (up to α-conversion), giving the control to the next argument u if the test succeeds, and to the second next argument v otherwise. In presence of the quote instruction, it is possible to implement a closed λ c -term eq ′ that has the very same computational behavior as eq, by letting
where eq nat is any closed λ-term that tests the equality between two numerals (using the encoding n → n).
• The instruction ⋔ ('fork'), that comes with the two evaluation rules
Intuitively, the instruction ⋔ behaves as a non deterministic choice operator, that indifferently selects its first or its second argument. The main interest of this instruction is that it makes evaluation non deterministic, in the following sense: The smallest relation of evaluation, that is defined as the union of the four rules (Push), (Grab), (Save) and (Restore), is clearly deterministic. The property of determinism still holds if we enrich the calculus with an instruction eq ( cc) together with the aforementioned evaluation rules, or with the instruction quote ( cc).
On the other hand, the presence of an instruction ⋔ with the corresponding evaluation rules definitely makes the relation of evaluation non deterministic.
2.4.
The thread of a process and its anatomy. Given a process p, we call the thread of p and write th(p) the set of all process p ′ such that p ≻ p ′ :
This set has the structure of a finite or infinite (di)graph whose edges are given by the relation ≻ 1 of one step evaluation. In the case where the relation of evaluation is deterministic, the graph th(p) can be either:
• Finite and cyclic from a certain point, because the evaluation of p loops at some point. A typical example is the process I ⋆ δδ · α (where I ≡ λx . x and δ ≡ λx . xx), that enters into a 2-cycle after one evaluation step:
• Finite and linear, because the evaluation of p reaches a state where no more rule applies. For example:
• Infinite and linear, because p has an infinite execution that never reaches twice the same state. A typical example is given by the process δ ′ δ ′ ⋆α, where δ ′ ≡ λx . x x I:
The two example of extra instructions quote and eq we gave in Section 2.3 have a strong impact on the potential behavior of processes. Indeed, they are able to distinguish syntactically different terms that are computationally equivalent, such as the terms I and II. To understand better the consequence of the presence of such extra instructions in the λ c -calculus, we need to introduce the important notion of interaction constant. This definition relies on the notions of substitution over terms and stacks, that are defined in Fig. 1 . Unlike the traditional form of substitution t{x := u} (which is only defined for terms), the substitutions t{c := u} and π{c := u} propagate through the continuation constants k π as well.
Definition 4.
A constant κ ∈ C is said to be • inert if for all π ∈ Π, there is no process p such that κ ⋆ π ≻ 1 p;
• substitutive if for all u ∈ Λ and for all processes p, p
A constant κ ∈ C that is inert, substitutive and non generative is then called an interaction constant. Similarly, we say that a stack constant α ∈ B is:
• substitutive if for all π ∈ Π and for all processes p, p
The main observation is that substitutive constants are incompatible with both instruction quote and eq (see [11] for a proof): Proposition 1. If the calculus of realizers contains one of both instructions quote or eq, then none of the constants κ ∈ C is substitutive.
The very same argument can be applied to prove the incompatibility of substitutive stack constants with the instruction quote. On the other hand, it is clear that if the relation of evaluation ≻ 1 is only defined from the rules (Grab),(Push),(Save) and (Restore) -and possibly: the rule (Fork)-then all the remaining constants κ in C (i.e. κ cc, ⋔) are interaction constants (and thus substitutive), whereas all the stack constants in B are substitutive and non generative. Substitutive (term and stack) constants are useful to analyze the computational behavior of realizers in a uniform way. For instance, if we know that a closed term t ∈ Λ is such that t ⋆ κ 1 · · · κ n · α ≻ p where κ 1 , . . . , κ n are substitutive constants that do not occur in t, and where α is a substitutive stack constant that does not occur in t too, then we more generally know that
for all terms u 1 , . . . , u n ∈ Λ and for all stacks π ∈ Π. Intuitively, substitutive constants play in the λ c -calculus the same role as free variables in the pure λ-calculus.
Classical second-order arithmetic
In Section 2 we have presented the computing facet of the theory of classical realizability. In this section, we shall now present its logical facet, by introducing the language of classical second-order logic with the corresponding type system. In section 3.3, we shall focus to the particular case of second-order arithmetic, and present its axioms.
3.1. The language of second-order logic. The language of second-order logic distinguishes two kinds of expressions: first-order expressions that represent individuals, and formulae, that represent propositions about individuals and sets of individuals (represented using second-order variables as we shall see below).
3.1.1. First-order expressions. First-order expressions are formally defined (see Fig. 1 ) from the following sets of symbols:
• A first-order signature Σ defining function symbols with their arities, and considering constant symbols as function symbols of arity 0. We assume that the signature Σ contains a constant symbol 0 ('zero'), a unary function symbol s ('successor') as well as a function symbol f for every primitive recursive function (including symbols +, ×, etc.), each of them being given its standard interpretation in N (see Section 3.3).
• A denumerable set V 1 of first-order variables. For convenience, we shall still use the lowercase letters x, y, z, etc. to denote first-order variables, but these variables should not be confused with the λ-variables introduced in Section 2. The set FV(e) of all (free) variables of a first-order expression e is defined as expected, as well as the corresponding operation of substitution, that we still write e{x := e ′ }.
3.1.2.
Formulae. Formulae of second-order logic are defined (see Fig. 1 ) from an additional set of symbols V 2 of second-order variables (or predicate variables), using the uppercase letters X, Y, Z, etc. to represent such variables :
We assume that each second-order variable X comes with an arity k ≥ 0 (that we shall often leave implicit, since it can be easily inferred from the context), and that for each arity k ≥ 0, the subset of V 2 formed by all second-order variables of arity k is denumerable. Intuitively, second-order variables of arity 0 represent (unknown) propositions, unary predicate variables represent predicates over individuals (or sets of individuals) whereas binary predicate variables represent binary relations (or sets of pairs), etc.
The set of free variables of a formula A is written FV(A). (This set may contain both first-order and second-order variables.) As usual, formulae are identified up to α-conversion, neglecting differences in bound variable names. Given a formula A, a firstorder variable x and a closed first-order expression e, we denote by A{x := e} the formula obtained by replacing every free occurrence of x by the first-order expression e in the formula A, possibly renaming some bound variables of A to avoid name clashes.
Lastly, although the formulae of the language of second-order logic are constructed from atomic formulae only using implication and first-and second-order universal quantifications, we can define other logical constructions (negation, conjunction disjunction, firstand second-order existential quantification as well as Leibniz equality) using the so called second-order encodings (cf Fig. 1 ).
3.1.3.
Predicates and second-order substitution. As in [11] , we call a predicate of arity k any expression of the form P ≡ λx 1 · · · x k . C where x 1 , . . . , x k are k pairwise distinct firstorder variables and where C is an arbitrary formula. (Here, we (ab)use the λ-notation to indicate which variables x 1 , . . . , x k are abstracted in the formula C).
The set of free variables of a k-ary
. . . ; x k }, and the application of the predicate P ≡ λx 1 · · · x k . C to a k-tuple of first-order expressions e 1 , . . . , e k is defined by letting
(by analogy with β-reduction). Given a formula A, a k-ary predicate variable X and an actual k-ary predicate P, we finally define the operation of second-order substitution A{X := P} as follows:
3.2. A type system for classical second-order logic. Through the formulae-as-types correspondence [12, 9] , we can see any formula A of second-order logic as a type, namely, as the type of its proofs. We shall thus present the deduction system of classical second-order logic as a type system based on a typing judgment of the form Γ ⊢ t : A, where
• Γ is a typing context of the form Γ ≡ x 1 : B 1 , . . . , x n : B n , where x 1 , . . . , x n are pairwise distinct λ-variables and where B 1 , . . . , B n are arbitrary propositions; • t is a proof-like term, i.e. a λ c -term containing no continuation constant k π ;
• A is a formula of second-order logic.
The type system of classical second-order logic is then defined from the typing rules of Fig. 1 . These typing rules are the usual typing rules of AF2 [15] , plus a specific typing rule for the instruction cc that permits to recover the full strength of classical logic.
Using the encodings of second-order logic, we can derive from the typing rules of Fig. 1 the usual introduction and elimination rules of absurdity, conjunction, disjunction, (firstand second-order) existential quantification and Leibniz equality [15] . The typing rule for call/cc (law of Peirce) allows us to construct proof-terms for classical reasoning principles such as the excluded middle, reductio ad absurdum, de Morgan laws, etc.
Classical second-order arithmetic (PA2)
. From now on, we consider the particular case of second-order arithmetic (PA2), where first-order expressions are intended to represent natural numbers. For that, we assume that every k-ary function symbol f ∈ Σ comes with an interpretation in the standard model of arithmetic as a function [ f ] : N k → N, so that we can give a denotation [e] ∈ N to every closed first-order expression e. Morover, we assume that each function symbol associated to a primitive recursive definition (cf Section 3.1.1) is given its standard interpretation in N. In this way, every numeral n ∈ N is represented in the world of first-order expressions as the closed expression s n (0) that we still write n, since [s n (0)] = n.
3.3.1. Induction. Following Dedekind's construction of natural numbers, we consider the predicate Nat(x) [9, 15] defined by
that defines the smallest class of individuals containing zero and closed under the successor function. One of the main properties of the logical system presented above is that the axiom of induction, that we can write ∀x Nat(x), is not derivable from the rules of Fig. 1 . As proved in [20, Theorem 12] , this axiom is even not (universally) realizable in general. To recover the strength of arithmetic reasoning, we need to relativize all first-order quantifications to the class Nat(x) of Dedekind numerals using the shorthands for numeric quantifications
so that the relativized induction axiom becomes provable in second-order logic [15] :
The axioms of PA2.
Formally, a formula A is a theorem of second-order arithmetic (PA2) if it can be derived (using the rules of Fig. 1 ) from the two axioms
(Peano 4th axiom) expressing that the successor function is injective and not surjective, and from the definitional equalities attached to the (primitive recursive) function symbols of the signature:
• etc. Unlike the non relativized induction axiom-that requires a special treatment in PA2-we shall see in Section 4.5 that all these axioms are realized by simple proof-like terms.
Classical realizability semantics
4.1. Generalities. Given a particular instance of the λ c -calculus (defined from particular sets B, C and from a particular relation of evaluation ≻ 1 as described in Section 2), we shall now build a classical realizability model in which every closed formula A of the language of PA2 will be interpreted as a set of closed terms |A| ⊆ Λ, called the truth value of A, and whose elements will be called the realizers of A.
Poles, truth values and falsity values.
Formally, the construction of the realizability model is parameterized by a pole in the sense of the following definition:
Definition 5 (Poles). -A pole is any set of processes ⊆ Λ ⋆ Π which is closed under anti-evaluation, in the sense that both conditions p ≻ p ′ and p ′ ∈ together imply that p ∈ for all processes p, p ′ ∈ Λ ⋆ Π.
We will mainly use one method to define a pole . From an arbitrary set of processes P, we can define pole as the complement set of the union of all threads starting from an element of P, that is:
It is indeed quite easy to check that is closed by anti-reduction, and it is also the largest pole that does not intersect P. We shall say that such a definition is thread-oriented. Let us now consider a fixed pole . We call a falsity value any set of stacks S ⊆ Π. Every falsity value S ⊆ Π induces a truth value S ⊆ Λ that is defined by
Intuitively, every falsity value S ⊆ Π represents a particular set of tests, while the corresponding truth value S represent the set of all programs that passes all tests in S (w.r.t. the pole , that can be seen as the challenge). From the definition of S , it is clear that the larger the falsity value S , the smaller the corresponding truth value S , and vice-versa.
Formulae with parameters.
In order to interpret second-order variables that occur in a given formula A, it is convenient to enrich the language of PA2 with a new predicate symbolḞ of arity k for every falsity value function F of arity k, that is, for every function F : N k → P(Π) that associates a falsity value F(n 1 , . . . , n k ) ⊆ Π to every k-tuple (n 1 , . . . , n k ) ∈ N k . A formula of the language enriched with the predicate symbolsḞ is then called a formula with parameters. Formally, this correspond to the formulae defined by: are extended to all formulae A with parameters, to all predicates P with parameters and to all typing contexts Γ with parameters in the obvious way.
Definition of the interpretation function.
The interpretation of the closed formulae with parameters is defined as follows:
Definition 6 (Interpretation of closed formulae with parameters). -The falsity value A ⊆ Π of a closed formula A with parameters is defined by induction on the number of connectives/quantifiers in A from the equations Ḟ (e 1 , . . . ,
whereas its truth value |A| ⊆ Λ is defined by |A| = A .
Since the falsity value A (resp. the truth value |A|) of A actually depends on the pole , we shall write it sometimes A (resp. |A| ) to recall the dependency. Given a closed formula A with parameters and a closed term t ∈ Λ, we say that:
• t realizes A and write t A when t ∈ |A| . (This notion is relative to a particular pole .) • t universally realizes A and write t A when t ∈ |A| for all poles . From these definitions, we have
Lemma 1 (Law of Peirce). -Let A and B be two closed formulae with parameters:
(
Valuations and substitutions.
In order to express the soundness invariants relating the type system of Section 3 with the classical realizability semantics defined above, we need to introduce some more terminology.
Definition 7 (Valuations). -A valuation is a function ρ that associates a natural number ρ(x) ∈ N to every first-order variable x and a falsity value function ρ(X) : N k → P(Π) to every second-order variable X of arity k.
• Given a valuation ρ, a first-order variable x and a natural number n ∈ N, we denote by ρ, x ← n the valuation defined by:
• Given a valuation ρ, a second-order variable X of arity k and a falsity value function F : N k → P(Π), we denote by ρ, x ← F the valuation defined by: 
• dom(σ) = dom(Γ);
• σ(x) A for every declaration (x : A) ∈ Γ.
4.4. Adequacy. Given a fixed pole , we say that: 
is adequate (w.r.t. the pole ) if the adequacy of all typing judgments J 1 , . . . , J n implies the adequacy of the typing judgment J 0 .
From the latter definition, it is clear that a typing judgment that is derivable from a set of adequate inference rules is adequate too. Fig. 1 (The proof of this result can be found in [20] .) Since the typing rules of Fig. 1 involve no continuation constant, every realizer that comes from a proof of second order logic by Prop. 2 is thus a proof-like term.
Proposition 2 (Adequacy). -The typing rules of

4.5.
Realizing the axioms of PA2. Let us recall that in PA2, Leibniz equality e 1 = e 2 is defined by e 1 = e 2 ≡ ∀Z (Z(e 1 ) ⇒ Z(e 2 )). x 1 , . . . , x n ) = e 2 (x 1 , . . . , x k )) for all arithmetic expressions e 1 (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and e 2 (x 1 , . . . ,
Proposition 3 (Realizing Peano axioms). :
(The proof of this proposition can be found in [20] ). From this we deduce the main theorem:
Theorem 1 (Realizing the theorems of PA2). -If A is a theorem of PA2 (in the sense defined in Section 3.3.2), then there is a closed proof-like term t such that t A.
Proof. Immediately follows from Prop. 2 and 3.
4.6. The full standard model of PA2 as a degenerate case. It is easy to see that when the pole is empty, the classical realizability model defined above collapses to the full standard model of PA2, that is: to the model (in the sense of Tarski) where individuals are interpreted by the elements of N and where second-order variables of arity k are interpreted by all the subsets of N k . For that, we first notice that when = ∅, the truth value S associated to an arbitrary falsity value S ⊆ Π can only take two different values: S = Λ c when S = ∅, and S = ∅ when S ∅. Moreover, we easily check that the realizability interpretation of implication and universal quantification mimics the standard truth value interpretation of the corresponding logical construction in the case where = ∅. Writing M for the full standard model of PA2, we thus easily show that: 
Proof. We more generally show that for all formulae A and for all valuations ρ closing A (in the sense defined in section 4.2) we have
whereρ is the valuation in M (in the usual sense) defined by
•ρ(x) = ρ(x) for all first-order variables x; However, the converse implication is false in general, since the formula ∀x Nat(x) (cf Section 3.3.1) that expresses the induction principle over individuals is obviously true in M, but it has no universal realizer when evaluation is deterministic [20, Theorem 12].
4.7. Leibniz equality. Before going further, we shall attract the reader attention to the treatment that is given to equality, which is crucial in what follows. We recall that the equality of two arithmetical expressions e 1 and e 2 is defined by the 2 nd -order encoding
Unfolding the definitions of falsity values, we easily get the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Given a pole , if e is an arithmetical expression, we have
The following corollaries are straightforward but will be very useful in Sections 5,6,7, so that it is worth to mention them briefly now.
Corollary 2.
Let be a fixed pole, e 1 , e 2 some arithmetical expressions, u ∈ Λ a closed term and π ∈ Π a stack such that u · π ∈ e 1 = e 2 . If M | = e 1 = e 2 then u ⋆ π ∈ .
Proof. By Lemma 2 we have u · π ∈ ∀X(X ⇒ X) = {u · π : ∃S ∈ P(Π), π ∈ S ∧ u ∈ |Ṡ |} so that u ∈ S and u ⋆ π ∈ Corollary 3. Given a pole , if e 1 , e 2 are arithmetical expressions, and u ∈ Λ, π ∈ Π are such that u · π e 1 = e 2 , then 
(2) By (1) we have
5. The specification problem 5.1. The specification problem. In the continuity of the work exposed in [11] , we are interested in the specification problem, that is to give a purely computational characterization of the universal realizers of a given formula A. As mentioned in this paper, this problem is much more subtle than in the case of intuitionistic realizability, what could be justified, amongst other things, by the presence of extra instructions that do not exist in the pure λ-calculus and by the ability of a realizer to backtrack at any time. Some very simple case, as the identity-type (∀X(X ⇒ X)) or the boolean-type (∀X(X ⇒ X ⇒ X)), are quite easy to specify, but more interestingly, it turns out that some more complex formulae, for instance the Law of Peirce, can also be fully specified [11] . In the following, we will focus on the generic case of arithmetical formulae. A premise of this works has been done in [10] for the particular case of formulae of the shape ∃ N n∀ N y( f (x, y) = 0). In the general case (that is with a finite alternation of quantifiers) an attempt to characterize the threads of universal realizers is also given in [18] , but the characterization that is given do not give a precise specification. As in [10] , our method will rely on game-theoretic interpretation of the formulae. formulae. Before going more into details, let us first look at the easiest example of specification.
Example 1 (Identity type).
In the language of second-order logic, the identity type is described by the formula ∀X(X ⇒ X). A closed term t ∈ Λ is said to be identity-like if t ⋆ u · π ≻ u ⋆ π for all u ∈ Λ and π ∈ Π. Examples of identity-like terms are of course the identity function I ≡ λx.x, but also terms such as II, δI (where δ ≡ λx.xx), λx.cc(λk.x), cc(λk.kIδk), etc.
Proposition 5 ([11]). For all terms t ∈ Λ, the following assertions are equivalent:
1) t ∀X(X ⇒ X) (2) t is identity-like
The interesting direction of the proof is (1) ⇒ (2). We prove it with the methods of threads, that we use later in Section 6. Assume t ∀X(X ⇒ X), and consider u ∈ Λ, π ∈ Π. We want to prove that t ⋆ u · π ≻ u ⋆ π. We define the pole
as well as the falsity value S = {π}. From the definition of , we know that t ⋆ u · π . As t Ṡ ⇒Ṡ and π ∈ Ṡ , we get u S . This means that u ⋆ π , that is t ⋆ u · π ≻ u ⋆ π.
Arithmetical formulae.
In this paper, we want to treat the case of first-order arithmetical formulae, that are Σ 0 n -formulae. As we explained in Section 3.3.1, in order to recover the strength of arithmetical reasoning, we will relativize all first-order quantifications to the class Nat(x). Besides, relativizing the quantifiers make the individuals visible in the stacks: indeed, a stack belonging to ∀ N xA(x) is of the shape n · π with π ∈ A(n) , whereas a stack of ∀xA(x) is of the form π ∈ A(n) for some n ∈ N the realizers do not have any physical access to.
Definition 9.
We define inductively the following classes of formulae:
• Σ n -formula Φ naturally induces a game between two players ∃ and ∀, that we shall name Eloise and Abelard from now on. Both players instantiate the corresponding quantifiers in turns, Eloise for defending the formula and Abelard for attacking it. The game, whose depth is bounded by the number of quantifications, proceeds as follows:
• When Φ is ∃xΦ ′ , Eloise has to give an integer m ∈ N, and the game goes on over the closed formula Φ ′ {x := m}.
• When Φ is ∀yΦ ′ , Abelard has to give an integer n ∈ N, and the game goes on over the closed formula Φ ′ {y := n}.
• When Φ is atomic and M Φ (Φ is true), Eloise wins, otherwise Abelard wins.
We say that a player has a winning strategy if (s)he has a way of playing that ensures him/her the victory independently of the opponent moves. It is obvious from Tarski's definition of truth that a closed arithmetical formula Φ is true in the ground model if and only if Eloise has a winning strategy.
The problem with this too simple definition is that winning strategies may be non computable (as we shall see below), so that they cannot be implemented by λ-terms. This why in classical logic, we will need to relax the rules of the above game to allow backtrack.
The Halting problem or the need of backtrack. For instance, let us consider a primitive recursive function
where Halt(m, n) is the primitive recursive predicate expressing that the m th Turing machine has stopped before n evaluation steps (in front of the empty tape). From this we consider the game on the formula
that expresses that any Turing machine terminates or does not terminate. (Intuitively y equals 0 when the machine x does not halt, and it represents a number larger than the execution length of x otherwise.) Yet, there is no pure λ-term computing directly from an m ∈ N such that ∀ N z( f (m, n m , z) = 0) (such a term would break the halting problem). However, Φ H could be classically realized, using the cc instruction. Let Θ be a λ-term such that : 
Proposition 6. t H Φ H
Proof. Let us consider a fixed pole and let m ∈ N be an integer, M be the m th Turing machine, and a stack u · π ∈ ∃ N y∀ N z( f (m, y, z) = 0) , and let us prove that t H ⋆ m· u · π ∈ . We know that
. Thus let us consider p ∈ N and a stack u ′ · π ′ ∈ f (m, 0, p) = 0 . We distinguish two cases :
• M is still running after p steps (that is M ¬Halt(m, p)). In this case, we have f (m, 0, p) = 0, and so by Corollary 2, u ′ ⋆ π ′ ∈ . Furthermore, by definition of Θ, we have
which concludes the case by anti-reduction.
• M stops before p steps (M Halt(m, p) ). By definition of Θ, we have in this case • First Eloise receives the code m of a Turing machine M , and chooses to play n = 0, that is "M never stops".
• Then Abelard answers a given number of steps p, and Eloise checks if M stops before p steps and distinguishes two cases : -either M is still running after p steps, hence f (m, 0, p) = 0 and Eloise wins.
-either M does stop before p steps, then Eloise backtracks to the previous position and instead of 0, it plays p, that is "M stops before p steps", which ensures him victory whatever Abelard plays after. This leads us to define a new notion of game with backtrack over arithmetical formulae.
G 0
Φ : a first game with backtrack. From now on, to simplify our works, we will always consider Σ 0 2h -formulae, that is of the form:
where h ∈ N and the notation x i refers to the tuple (x 1 , . . . , x i ) (we will denote the concatenation by · :
. It is clear that any arithmetical formulae can be written equivalently in that way, adding some useless quantifiers if needed. Given such a formula Φ, we define a game G 0 Φ between Eloise and Abelard whose rules are basically the same as they were before, except that we will keep track of all the former ∃-positions, allowing Eloise to backtrack. We call an ∃-position of size i ∈ 0, h a pair of tuple of integers ( m i , n i ) standing for the instantiation of the variables x i , y i , while a ∀-position will be a pair of the form ( m i+1 , n i ). We call history of a game and note H the set of every former ∃-positions. The game starts with an empty history (H = {∅}) and proceeds as follows :
• ∃-move: Eloise chooses a position ( m i , n i ) ∈ H for some i ∈ 0, h − 1 , and proposes m i+1 ∈ N, so that ( m i+1 , n i ) becomes the current ∀-position. • ∀-move: Abelard has to answer with some n i+1 ∈ N to complete the position. If i + 1 = h and f ( m h , n h ) = 0, then Eloise wins and the game stops. Otherwise, we simply add the new ∃-position ( m i+1 , n i+1 ) to H, and the game goes on. We say that Abelard wins if the game goes on infinitely, that is if Eloise never wins.
Given a set H of former ∃-positions, we will say that Eloise has a winning strategy and write H ∈ W 0 Φ if she has a way of playing that ensures her a victory, independently of future Abelard moves.
Formally, we can define the set W 0 Φ by induction with the two following rules :
Given a formula Φ, the only difference between this game and the one we defined in Section 5.2 is that this one allows Eloise to make some wrong tries before moving to a final position. Clearly, there is a winning strategy G Given a formula Φ, in both games the existence of a winning strategy is equivalent to the truth in the model, hence such a definition does not carry anything new from an outlook of model theory, the interest of this definition is fundamentally computational. For instance, for the halting problem, this will now allow Eloise to use the strategy we described in the previous section.
Besides, it is worth notice that in general, the match somehow grows among a tree of height h, as we shall see in the following example.
Example 2.
We define the following function
where . − refers to the truncated subtraction. Notice that g(x, ·) is clearly bounded if x 0. Then we consider f a function such that
Finally, we define the formula ϕ ∈ Σ
which expresses that there exists x 1 (in fact 0) such that g(y 1 , ·) : z → g(y 1 , z) is bounded for every y 1 x 1 . The shortest strategy for Eloise to win that game would be to give 0 for x 1 , wait for an answer m for y 1 , and give m + 1 for x 2 . But we can also imagine that Eloise might try 0 first, receive Abelard answer, and then change her mind, start from the beginning with 1, try several possibilities before going back to the winning position. If we observe the positions Eloise will reach for such a match, we remark it draws a tree (see Figure 2 ). We shall formalize this remark later, but we strongly enjoy the reader to keep 6. Implementing the game 6.1. Substitutive Game : G 1 Φ . Now that we disposed of a notion of game that seems to be suitable to capture computational content of classical theorems, we shall adapt it to play with realizers. Considering a formula
we will have to consider sub-formulae of Φ to write down proofs about Φ. Therefore we give the following abbreviations 3 that will be in force in the following:
To play with realizers, we will slightly change the setting of G 0 Φ , adding processes. One should notice that we only add more information, so that the game G 1 Φ is somehow a "decorated" version of G 0 Φ . In order to describe the match, we use ∃-positions -which are just processes-and ∀-positions -which are 4-tuples of the shape ( m i , n i , u, π) ∈ N ≤h ×N ≤h ×Λ c ×Π. If i = h, we say that the move is final or complete. In a given time j, the set of all ∀-moves reached before is called the history and is denoted as H j . At each time j, the couple given by the current ∃-position p j and the history H j is called the j-th state. The state evolves throughout the match according to the following rules:
(1) Eloise proposes a term t 0 ∈ PL supposed to defend Φ and Abelard proposes a stack u 0 · π 0 supposed to attack the formula Φ. We say that at time 0, the process p 0 := t 0 ⋆ u 0 · π 0 is the current ∃-position and H 0 := ∅ is the current history. This step defines the initial state p 0 , H 0 . (2) Assume p j , H j is the j th state. Starting from p j Eloise evaluates p j in order to reach one of the following situations: and we add the ∀-position to the history: Start with a term t is a "good move" for Eloise if and only if, proposed as a defender of the formula, t defines an initial winning state (for Eloise), independently from the initial stack proposed by Abelard. In this case, adopting the point of view of Eloise, we just say that t is a winning strategy for the formula Φ.
Since our characterization of realizers will be in terms of winning strategies, we might formalize this notion. We define inductively the set of winning states -which is a syntactic object-by means of a deductive system:
A term t is say to be a winning strategy for Φ if for any handle (u, π) ∈ Λ × Π, we have
Proposition 8 (Adequacy). If t is a winning strategy for
We will see a more general game in the following section for which we will prove the adequacy property (Proposition 13) and which admits any winning strategy of this game as winning strategy (Proposition 12), thus proving the adequacy in the current case. Furthermore, the proof we give for Proposition 13 is suitable for this game too.
Completeness of G
1 Φ in presence of interaction constants. In this section we will show the completeness of G 1 Φ by substitution over the thread of execution of a universal realizer of Φ. As observed in section 5.4, the successive ∃-positions form a tree. We give thereafter a formal statement for this observation, which will allow us to prove the completeness of this game. We shall now give a formal definition of a tree.
Definition 10.
A (finite) tree T is a (finite) subset 4 of N <ω such that if τ · c ∈ T and c ∈ N, then τ ∈ T and ∀c ′ < c, τ · c ′ ∈ T , where the · operator denote the concatenation. If τ = c 0 · · · c k , we use the notation τ |i = c 0 · · · c i , and we note τ ⊏ σ ( σ extends τ) when :
We call characteristic function of a tree T any partial function ϕ : N → N <ω such that: 
Example 3. Before doing the proof, let us give a look to an example of such a thread scheme for a formula Φ ∈ Σ 0 4 (as we considered in Example 2) and to the corresponding tree and characteristic function. We observe that we could actually labeled any node of the tree using its order of apparition in the enumeration of T with ϕ. Definition 11. Given such a thread scheme and a path τ ∈ T , we define m τ = m ϕ −1 (τ) (integer m at the node τ), m τ = (m τ |1 , m τ |2 , . . . , m τ ) (integers m along the path) and the substitution along τ is :
For instance, in Figure 3 , for τ = 1 · 1 (wich corresponds to the choosen final position κ 4 ⋆ α 4 ), we have :
We build a sequence (Q i ) i∈N of sets of processes and a sequence of characteristic functions (ϕ i ) i∈N for some trees (T i ) i∈N , such that at each step i ∈ N, Q i is either empty either of the form th(p) for some p ∈ Λ × Π :
• i = 0 : we set Q 0 = th(t 0 ⋆ κ 0 · α 0 ) and ϕ 0 : 0 → ∅ • i ∈ N : given Q i and ϕ i , if there exist 5 j ∈ N, m i+1 ∈ N and t i+1 ∈ Λ such that κ j ⋆ m i+1 · t i+1 · α j ∈ Q i we set :
otherwise Q i+1 := ∅ and ϕ i+1 := ϕ i . We define Q ∞ := i∈N Q i , := Q c ∞ and ϕ := lim i∈ω ϕ i . We prove by induction that for any 0 ≤ i ≤ h, the following statement holds :
From the definition of , we have t 0 ⋆ κ 0 · α 0 . Besides, we know that t 0 E 0 , so
Recall that
. By definition of , it means that there is some j ∈ N such that this process belong to Q j , so that by definition of Q j+1 we have t j+1 = t, m j+1 = m, ϕ( j + 1) |i = ϕ( j i ),
Using the fact that t j+1 ∀ N y i+1 E i+1 [σ(ϕ( j i ))]{x i+1 := m}, we finally get that
We obtain then for IH h the following statement :
Applying the lemma 3, we get that M f ( m σ , n σ ) = 0 and κ s ⋆ α s . Hence there exists f ∈ N such that κ s ⋆ α s ∈ Q f , thus
that is the last line of the expected thread scheme.
Besides, by definition of Q f and ϕ f , we clearly have that for any i ∈ [0, f − 1], there exists j ∈ N such that j ≤ i and
Remark that, as the constants κ i and α i are substitutive, the function ϕ and the integers f and s only depend on the sequence (n i ) i∈N . In other words, the threads scheme is entirely defined by this sequence.
Proposition 9 (Completeness in presence of interaction constants). If the calculus of realizers is deterministic and contains infinitely many interaction constants as well as infinitely many substitutive and non generative stack constants, then every universal realizer of an arithmetical formula
h is a winning strategies for the game G 1 Φ 5 Note that as the calculus is deterministic and the constants κ j inert, if such j, m i+1 , t i+1 exist, they are unique Proof. Consider Φ ∈ Σ 6.3. A wild realizer. The previous section gives a specification of arithmetical formulae in the particular case where the language of realizers is deterministic 6 and provides infinitely many interaction constants and infinitely many substitutive and non generative stack constants. These assumptions are actually incompatible with the presence of instructions such as eq or quote, as stated by the Proposition 1, since this break the property of substitutivity. It would be pleasing to be able to extend such a characterization to a more general framework that would allow such instructions. Nevertheless, we know from [11] that it was not possible for the Law of Peirce, and it is not possible either in this case, for the very same reason : the instruction eq (that could be simulated with quote, see Section 2.3) allows to define some wild realizers for some formulae, that is realizers of some Φ that are not winning strategies for the game
, here is an example of such a wild realizer. We define the following terms
From these definitions we get for all u ∈ Λ and π ∈ Π:
and moreover, for all n ∈ N, u ′ ∈ Λ and π ′ ∈ Π:
Proof. Let us consider a fixed pole and a stack u · π ∈ ∃ N x∀ N y( f ≤ (x, y) = 0) , that is a falsity value S such that π ∈ Ṡ and u ∈ |∀ N x(∀ N y( f ≤ (x, y) = 0) ⇒Ṡ )| We distinguish two cases :
, which allows to conclude by anti-evaluation.
Notice that the subterm I that appears in the definition of the term T 2 never comes to active position in the proof of Proposition 10, so that we could actually have chosen any other closed λ c -term instead. The point is that it can only occurs if (u ′ , π ′ ) ≡ (T 0 [u, n π ], π), and when it is the case, we are no more interested in the end of the execution of the process T 0 [u, n π ] ⋆ π, that is in a way allowed to do anything in the rest of its execution. Before giving a game-theoretic interpretation of this phenomena, we first check that t ≤ is not a winning strategy for the game G 6 Actually, this assumption is not necessary, and has been made only for convenience in the proof of Lemma 3. In fact, we could adapt this proof to a non-deterministic case, by defining Q i+1 as the union of the threads th(t i ⋆ n i+1 · κ i+1 · α i+1 ) for all j ∈ N, m i+1 ∈ N and t i+1 ∈ Λ such that κ j ⋆ m i+1 · t i+1 · α j ∈ Q i . But in this case the characteristic function of the tree describing the thread scheme is more subtle to construct. • if (u 1 , π 1 ) (T 0 [u, n π ], π), Eloise simply pursues the execution to reach u 1 ⋆ π 1 , which is a final winning position, as 0 ≤ n 1 .
, as no interesting move can be obtained from the current position, Eloise backtracks to the former ∃-position t ≤ ⋆ u · π, and now wins since
That is to say that the term t ≤ can still be seen as a winning strategy if we give the right to Eloise to compute its move from any former ∃-position. This gives us a new game G 2 Φ , in which Eloise keeps track of all the previous ∃-positions encountered during the game.
We thus define a G 2 Φ -state as a pair P, H , where P is now a finite set of processes (intuitively, all ∃-positions, including the current one), and H is exactly as in G • if there is p ∈ P and (
A term t is say to be a winning strategy for 
Φ (which is also proved by induction).
Proposition 13 (Adequacy). If t is a winning strategy for
To make the proof easier, we will use the formulae A and E that we previously defined in Section 6.1.
Let be a fixed pole, S 1 be a falsity value, u 0 ∀ N x 1 (E 1 ⇒Ṡ 1 )) ⇒Ṡ 1 and π 0 ∈ S 1 , and let us show that t ⋆ u 0 · π 0 ∈ . For that, we more generally prove the following statement:
We proceed by induction on the derivation of P, H ∈ W Φ , distinguishing the two possible cases:
Φ because of the first induction rule: there exists ( m h , n h , u, π) ∈ H and p ∈ P such that p ≻ u ⋆ π and M f ( m h , n h ) = 0. If we assume that
Φ because of the second induction rule : there is some p i ∈ P, ( m i , n i , u i , π i ) ∈ H and m ∈ N such that p i ≻ u i ⋆ m · ξ · π i , and for any (n, u, π),
Φ . We prove that we can not have P ∩ = ∅. Indeed, assuming it is the case, we can show that u i ⋆ m · ξ · π i ∈ . Besides, we know by hypothesis that
{x i+1 := m} to conclude. So pick n ∈ N, u·π ∈ E i+1 {x j := m j , y j := n j } i j=1 {x i+1 := m}{y i+1 := n} , and let us prove that ξ ⋆ n · u · π ∈ . We have by hypothesis that
from which we deduce by induction (the premises are verified) that
As P ∩ = ∅, we get that ξ ⋆ n · u · π ∈ , which conclude this case.
In particular, we have {t
Proposition 14 (Completeness). If t Φ then t is a winning strategy.
Proof. Let us reason by contradiction by assuming that there exists a handle (u 0 , π 0 )
Φ . We will construct an increasing sequence ( P j , H j ) j∈N such that for any j ∈ N, P j , H j W 2 Φ . For that, let us pick a fixed enumeration φ : N → N × Λ such that every pair (m, t) appears infinitely many times in the range of φ. The sequence ( P j , H j ) is then defined as follows:
• We set P 0 = {t ⋆ u 0 · π 0 } and H 0 = {(∅, ∅, u 0 , π 0 )}.
• Assume we have built a state P j , H j W 2 Φ . Writing (m, t) = φ( j), we distinguish the two following cases: (1) Either there exists p ∈ P j and (
From the second rule of induction we get the existence of n ∈ N, u ′ ∈ Λ,
Φ . We pick such a tuple (n, u ′ , π ′ ) and define
Either there is no such process, and we set P j+1 = P j and H j+1 = H j . In both case, we have construct P j+1 and H j+1 such that P j ⊂ P j+1 , H j ⊂ H j+1 and P j+1 , H j+1 W 2 Φ . We set P ∞ = j∈N P j , Q = p∈P ∞ th(p) and = Q c .
By construction, we have t ⋆ u 0 · π 0 , and as t
, that is exists an index j ∈ N and a process p ∈ P j such that
Iterating this very same reasoning, we obtain that for every i ∈ 1, h , there exists an index k i ∈ N and a closed term ξ i ∈ Λ, such that H k i contains a tuple ( m i , n i , u i , π i ), with 
, that is to say there is some j ∈ N and p ∈ P j such that p ≻ u h ⋆ π h . Taking l = max( j, k h ), this contradict the fact that (
because of the first rule of induction.
Theorem 2. If Φ is an arithmetical formula, there exists t Φ if and only if t implements a winning strategy for
8. A barrier for realizability models 8.1. A universal realizer for every formulae. We show here that if an arithmetical formula Φ ≡ ∃ N x 1 . . . ∀ N y h f ( m h , n h ) = 0 is true in the ground model, as soon as we dispose of a term computing f , we can implement a winning strategy, hence a universal realizer. The idea of the strategy for Eloise is to enumerate "smartly" N h , in the following sense: when playing a tuple m h , we first look as deep as possible in the tree of formers positions for the tuple m i , and then go with corresponding Abelardanswer. In doing so we ensure that any tuple m i will always be played with the same answers n i . Then it is clear that is M Φ, we will reach sooner or later a winning position.
To implement such a strategy, we assume that we have a term computing f on a given position :
where m i is a λ c -implementation 7 for the tuple m i , and that we also have a term next acting as a successor for N h . here the data-type would not be relevant, we only pay attention to some "big" steps of reduction independently of technical representation of data 8 
Then we build 
Then by Lemma 4 we get that there exists H 0 such that P(h, m 0 h , H 0 ) holds, and the claim follows by easy induction. Then we set H = j∈N H j , that is functional (because each H j is, and H j ⊂ H j+1 ).
Applying the first clause of Lemma 5, we get that for all j ∈ N, there exists n
Furthermore, as H is functional, it easily implies that:
and thus we finally get M Φ.
Combining the results we obtained at this point, we get the following theorem : Proof. The first direction is a consequence of Propositions 15 and 13, the reverse directly comes from Proposition 4.
Leibniz equality vs primitive non-equality.
Here we have chosen to consider formulae based on equalities, and we should wonder what happens if we use instead formulae based on disequalities : ∃x 1 ∀y 1 . . . ∃x n ∀y n f ( x n , y n ) 0 .
We know that both definitions are equivalent from a model-theoretic point of view. Indeed, if we define the following function h:
then for all x ∈ N n , M f ( x) = 0 if and only if M (h • f )( x) 0. In other words, formulae based on a non-equality have the same expressiveness, and we also might have chosen it as definition for the arithmetical formulae (see Definition 9) .
In classical realizability the disequality can be a given a simple semantic:
which is equivalent to the negation of equality. Indeed, one can easily check that we have λxt.x e 1 e 2 ⇒ ¬(e 1 = e 2 ) and λt.(t)I ¬(e 1 = e 2 ) ⇒ e 1 e 2 . Yet using these definitions, the rules of the game would have slightly changed. Indeed, if we observe closely what happens at the last level of the game (with every variable already instantiated but the one of the last universal quantifier), that is a formula ∀ N y( f (y) 0), if the formula is true in the model, then the falsity value is empty, so that the opponent can not give any answer :
Hence Eloise does not have to compute the formula f to know whether she can win or not, she only has to wait for a potential answer of Abelard, and keep on playing if she eventually gets one. We shall bring the reader to notice two important facts. First, it is clear that as Eloise has no need to compute f , she only needs to do somehow a "blind" enumeration, hence we can build the very same realizer we built in Proposition 15 without using a term computing f . In fact, such a realizer would be suitable for any f , even not computable, that is : it is clear that f is not computable and that M ∀y∃x( f (y, x) = 0) (that only says that a Turing machine stops or does not stop). We know by Proposition 16 that there is a term t H ∈ Λ c such that t H ∀ N y∃ N x(h • f )(y, x) 0, but there is no term t such that t ∀ N y∃ N x f (y, x) = 0, and thus no term t
. This phenomena is quite surprising 10 , as both formulae were perfectly equivalent in the ground model. As we explained, a game-theoretic interpretation of this fact reposed on the idea that the use of a non-equality leaves the computation to the opponent, and doing so make the game easier. But in author's opinion, this does not furnish a satisfying enough explanation for the model-theoretic point of view, and it might interesting to deal with this phenomena more deeply.
8.3. Connection with forcing. In this paper, we only considered the standard realizability models of PA2 (following the terminology of [21] ), that is: the realizability models parameterized on tuples of the form (Λ, Π, ≻, ), where (Λ, Π, ≻) is a particular instance of the λ c -calculus, and where is a ¡. The strong separation between the calculus (on one side) and the pole (on the other side) is essential to define the notion of universal realizability, which is at the heart of the specification problem studied in this paper.
However, the definitions of classical realizability can be extended in many different ways. First, we may replace second-order arithmetic (PA2) by Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF), using a model-theoretic construction [16, 22] that is reminiscent from the construction of forcing models and of Boolean-valued models of ZF. Mutatis mutandis, all the results presented in this paper remain valid in the framework of classical realizability models of ZF, provided we consider a representation of arithmetical formulae in the language of set theory that preserves their computational interpretation in the sense of PA2 (see [22] ).
Second, we may replace the terms and stacks of the λ c -calculus by the A-terms and A-stacks of an arbitrary classical realizability algebra A, as shown in [21, 22] . Intuitively, classical realizability algebras generalize λ c -calculi (with poles) the same way as partial combinatory algebras [13] generalize the λ-calculus (or Gödel codes for partial recursive functions) in the framework of intuitionistic realizability. This broad generalization of classical realizability-in a framework where terms and stacks are not necessarily of a combinatorial nature-is essential, since it allows us to make explicit the connection between forcing and classical realizability. Indeed, any complete Boolean algebra can be presented as a classical realizability algebra, so that all Boolean-valued models of ZF (or forcing models) can be actually seen as particular cases of classical realizability models of ZF. (In this setting, the combination of realizability and forcing presented in [21, 27] can be seen as a generalization of the method of iterated forcing.)
In the general framework of classical realizability algebras, the specification problem studied in this paper does not make sense anymore (due to the loss of the notion of universal realizability), but we can still use the λ c -terms presented in Section 8.1 to show more generally that every arithmetical formula that is true in the ground model is realized by a proof-like term. This shows that arithmetical formulae remain absolute in the framework of classical realizability models of set theory, which generalizes a well-known property of forcing models to classical realizability. Actually, recent work of Krivine [23] suggests that this result extends to the class of Σ 
